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Abstract
Linkage of population-based administrative data is a valuable tool for combining detailed individual-level information from
different sources for research. While not a substitute for classical studies based on primary data collection, analyses of
linked administrative data can answer questions that require large sample sizes or detailed data on hard-to-reach
populations, and generate evidence with a high level of external validity and applicability for policy making. There are
unique challenges in the appropriate research use of linked administrative data, for example with respect to bias from
linkage errors where records cannot be linked or are linked together incorrectly. For confidentiality and other reasons,
the separation of data linkage processes and analysis of linked data is generally regarded as best practice. However, the
‘black box’ of data linkage can make it difficult for researchers to judge the reliability of the resulting linked data for their
required purposes. This article aims to provide an overview of challenges in linking administrative data for research. We
aim to increase understanding of the implications of (i) the data linkage environment and privacy preservation; (ii) the
linkage process itself (including data preparation, and deterministic and probabilistic linkage methods) and (iii) linkage
quality and potential bias in linked data. We draw on examples from a number of countries to illustrate a range of
approaches for data linkage in different contexts.
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Background
Administrative data collected for ﬁnancial or clinical
management purposes contain rich, detailed informa-
tion, and their great potential for research has been
increasingly exploited over recent years. Linking
together information across multiple data sources
(e.g. health, social welfare, or employment) can further
enhance existing data. As traditional methods for data
collection (e.g. cohort studies and surveys) become
more problematic due to high cost and low response
rates or attrition, use of linked individual-level data has
become an attractive alternative (Jutte et al., 2011;
Pearson, 2015).
The strengths of linked administrative data are well-
characterised, particularly for research requiring large
sample sizes, detailed data on hard-to-reach popula-
tions, or little loss to follow-up, and for generating
evidence with a high level of external validity and
applicability for policy making (Holman et al., 2008).
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However, the limitations of administrative data are also
well understood, particularly those relating to data
quality and missing data (Hashimoto et al., 2014; van
Walraven and Austin, 2012). For example, missing data
can occur in the traditional sense, i.e. where recording is
incomplete, but can also occur if a person fails to inter-
act with a service (e.g. a school based exam or a hos-
pital clinic) and is therefore not captured in the
administrative data (Weitoft et al., 1999). Data linkage
adds a further dimension: missing or inaccurate data
can also be introduced if the individual’s school or
hospital record could not be accurately linked due to
insuﬃcient identifying information.
Linkage of administrative data to support popula-
tion-based analyses also poses a unique set of methodo-
logical challenges related to the use of personal
identiﬁers. In many jurisdictions, the separation of link-
age and analysis processes is considered as best practice
for conﬁdentiality, meaning that those conducting the
linkage (often a ‘trusted third party’) only have access
to a set of identiﬁers, whilst those analysing the linked
data only have access to de-identiﬁed attribute data
(Kelman et al., 2002). Although this strategy limits the
risk of disclosing sensitive information about individ-
uals, the separation of functions means that important
aspects of the linkage process, which impact on the reli-
ability of the resulting linked dataset, can be obscured
from those analysing and interpreting the linked data.
This aim of this article is to improve understanding
of approaches to administrative data linkage, and to
provide an overview of important considerations for
linking administrative data for research. We begin by
considering the data linkage environment and the
implications of safeguarding administrative personal
data. We then provide an overview of the linkage pro-
cess, including data preparation and linkage methods,
and discuss how these processes may aﬀect the linked
dataset. Finally, we consider linkage quality and evalu-
ation, and the implications of potential bias due to
errors occurring during the linkage process. We draw
on examples from a number of countries to illustrate
approaches for data linkage in diﬀerent contexts.
The data linkage environment
A number of models for data linkage studies exist across
diﬀerent jurisdictions, with diﬀering degrees of separ-
ation between linkage and analysis processes. The strict-
est ofmodels involves identiﬁable data accessed only by a
trusted third party (who conduct the linkage), whilst the
research group only access de-identiﬁed attribute data
required for analysis. For example, the Data Linkage
Branch in Western Australia and the Centre for Health
Record Linkage (CHeReL) in New South Wales receive
identiﬁable data and use these to create anonymous
‘linkage keys’. These linkage keys are passed to research-
ers,who can thenmerge together the corresponding attri-
bute data (e.g. clinical or service records) required for
their analysis (without ever seeing any identiﬁers). This
linkage model creates enduring links that are stored in
perpetuity within the system, meaning that records do
not need to be repeatedly matched for diﬀerent studies
(Dibben et al., 2015). Similarly, the SAIL Databank in
Wales does not hold identiﬁers, but retains an
Anonymous Linking Field (ALF), which is unique for
each person and used to link multiple datasets for
research (Jones et al., 2014). The Centre for Data
Linkage (CDL) in Australia uses a similar model,
except that identiﬁable data are received and linked on
a project by project basis (Boyd et al., 2012).
Linkage models can vary within countries. Whilst
the Manitoba Centre for Health Policy in Canada fol-
lows the same model as Australia, a diﬀerent model
operates at Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences
(ICES) in Ontario. ICES is legally allowed to receive
fully identiﬁable data in order to perform linkage,
assess data quality and provide coded data to research
staﬀ within the organisation. They operate a hierarch-
ical access policy, which means that only a speciﬁed
number of people have the highest level of access to
all data elements, and most researchers can only
access de-identiﬁed, coded data relevant to their
study. A modiﬁcation to this system is the ‘split-ﬁle’
approach, used in Population Data BC, where identi-
ﬁers are stripped from attribute data as soon as they are
received, and stored separately, only being accessed by
a certain number of programmers (who do not access
the attribute data) (Dibben et al., 2015).
Full separation of identiﬁers and attribute data has
been argued to reduce the risk of re-identiﬁcation, and
is a valuable tool in reassuring data providers about
the security of sharing their data. However, allowing
linkage and analysis to take place together provides
opportunities for both in-depth evaluation of linkage
quality, and methodological advances in linkage tech-
niques (Aldridge et al., 2015; Harron et al., 2013). For
example, this approach can allow alternative linkage
variables that are not considered as typical personal
identiﬁers (such as dates or diagnoses) to be incorpo-
rated into linkage algorithms or validation procedures
(Hagger-Johnson et al., 2014; Harron et al., 2016).
Accessing linked data for research
Eﬀective data linkage environments protect conﬁdenti-
ality whilst facilitating research use of personal data
(deﬁned in the UK as data relating to living individuals
who can be identiﬁed from those data, or from data or
other information in the possession of the data control-
ler) (Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce, 2016).
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Producing completely anonymous datasets (where it is
not possible to identify any individual) would be pro-
tective of conﬁdentiality (Information Commissioner’s
Oﬃce, 2012; Ohm, 2010). However, it is increasingly
clear that full anonymization of individual-level data
is virtually impossible whilst retaining suﬃcient granu-
larity for research (de Montjoye et al., 2015). Instead,
conﬁdentially is preserved through a combination of (i)
comprehensive data access approvals, (ii) requirements
on the researcher, including training and sanctions and
(iii) physical or virtual settings that restrict the possibil-
ity of re-identiﬁcation of individuals or inadvertent
or deliberate misuse of data. Key points of the three
components of the data linkage environment are sum-
marised in Box 1.
Firstly, access to linked administrative data is usu-
ally overseen by an approvals panel, who consider a
number of details about the data requested and the
credentials of the requesting institution and research-
er(s), including appropriate security measures and
governance training. Approval panels are concerned
with conﬁrming the legal basis for disclosing data,
and often take into account whether the proposed
research is in the public beneﬁt, and whether this bene-
ﬁt is outweighed by any potential risks of using the data
(Dibben et al., 2015). In the UK, approvals ensure that
data use meets the principles of Data Protection
Act 1998, i.e. fair and lawful processing of data
(Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce, 2016). In Brazil,
while there is legal support for the use of administrative
data for research, clear evidence of advantages of data
linkage for health policy is required for ethics commit-
tee approval (Farinelli et al., 2015). In Australia, record
linkage stakeholders are regulated by legislation and
contractual obligations relating to privacy and
conﬁdentiality.
Applications may need to be made to a number of
panels, who consider diﬀerent and overlapping aspects
of a study. For example in the UK, a research study
proposing linkage of identiﬁable data without consent
would require applications to the data provider (e.g. the
Oﬃce of National Statistics for death registration
data), the trusted third party (e.g. NHS Digital, who
perform linkage with hospital records), a local or
national research ethics committee, and the
Conﬁdentiality Advisory Group (an independent body
providing advice on applications to use conﬁdential
patient data without consent). In Australia, the feder-
ated government system means that various datasets
are gathered at diﬀerent tiers of administration, with
diﬀerent jurisdictions being responsible for diﬀerent
data collections. Complete population coverage can
only be achieved through linkage between jurisdictions.
However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the access
and approvals processes between each jurisdiction,
often requiring researchers to obtain approval from
combinations of data custodians, data linkage units
and ethics committees across each legal jurisdiction.
The second component of the safe environment is
the researcher. Researchers are expected to undergo
information governance training before accessing
data. Once data access is approved, researchers are typ-
ically required to abide by a license or contract, setting
out the ways in which data may be processed.
Any breaches of these contracts are subject to strict
sanctions, often at the institutional level, which provide
a deterrent to intentional or negligent behaviour. For
example in the UK, monetary penalty notices of up to
£500,000 can be levied for any data breaches. Penalties
are publically available online, with implications for the
reputation of both the associated researcher and their
institution.
Box 1. Considerations for safe data linkage environments.
Context Key points
Data access
approvals
 Comprehensive approvals processes typic-
ally check that:
 There is a legal basis for data access
 There are appropriate security
arrangements
 Data are used only for a specified pur-
pose, are kept only for a specified length
of time, and are not further disclosed
 The requesting institution has appropri-
ate credentials
 The ethics of the proposed study have
been properly scrutinised
Researcher
requirements
 Researchers have a responsibility, often laid
out in terms of use, to use data for bona
fide purposes only
 Researchers should receive regular training
in information governance
 Legal sanctions are in place where data are
used inappropriately or without due care
Physical or
virtual
setting
 Secure physical, or virtual, locations estab-
lished for the processing and linkage of
personal or potentially identifiable data,
characterised by:
 Strict access arrangements
 Secure data transfer processes
 Restricted network and/or internet
access
 Tight disclosure control procedures
 For example, aggregate data only, sup-
pression of small cell sizes (e.g.< 5),
k-anonymity
 Help protect against outsider attacks or
coercion
 Provide tangible reassurance on data
security to the public
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The ﬁnal component of the data linkage environ-
ment is the physical or virtual setting within which
data processing takes place. A safe setting (or safe
haven) is a secure location where data are stored or
accessed via a secure network link, which is subject to
strict access arrangements. An important aspect of the
safe setting is how outputs are checked (a process
known as statistical disclosure control). In the context
of linked administrative data, statistical disclosure con-
trol attempts to limit the risk of identiﬁcation (i.e. ﬁnd-
ing out the identity of someone in a dataset) and
attribution (i.e. associating information held in a
record with a particular individual). A detailed descrip-
tion of statistical disclosure control mechanisms can be
found elsewhere (Longhurst et al., 2011). A simple
example of this process used in many countries is
where outputs are checked to ensure that no small
cell sizes (e.g. <5) are released outside of the safe set-
ting. More sophisticated approaches include k-anon-
ymity, which ensures that any individual cannot be
distinguished from k-1 other individuals (Information
Commissioner’s Oﬃce, 2012).
Implications for research
Some argue that such extensive governance require-
ments can be a barrier to research, and that the
harms from not using administrative data are greater
than the risks (Jones et al., 2017). Firstly, data access
applications often require a substantial investment of
researcher time, and approvals are subject to long-
delays that are diﬃcult to align with project schedules
and funding timelines (Dattani et al., 2013). Where
application processes are not streamlined, the need to
obtain approval from a number of diﬀerent bodies can
result in the same information being reviewed by diﬀer-
ent panels, each with diﬀerent remits and perspectives.
Secondly, physical safe settings are not typically
optimal for research, as they may require travel and
be restricted to set hours, and analyses often need
to be repeatedly reﬁned and reworked. Virtual safe set-
tings are more ﬂexible as they allow secure, remote
access to data, but may be restricted by strict disclosure
control procedures that, whilst appropriate for some
analyses, would not be suﬃcient for others that require
ﬁne-grained individual-level data (e.g. time-to-event
models) (Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce, 2012).
In some countries, organisations that help research-
ers navigate the complex requirements and facilitate
access to linked administrative data for research have
been established. For example, the Administrative Data
Research Network (ADRN) was established as a UK-
wide partnership between universities, government
departments, national statistics authorities, and funders
and researchers. The ADRN includes an approvals
panel (who examine each research proposal), an accre-
dited researcher training programme (the Secure Users
of Research data Environment (SURE) training), and a
safe setting within which researchers can access de-iden-
tiﬁed administrative data (with statistical disclosure
procedures applied to any data taken outside the safe
setting).
The linkage process
Data preparation
As many administrative datasets contain inconsistent,
inaccurate or incomplete data that vary in structure,
format and content, data pre-processing is a time-con-
suming but vital aspect of linkage (Playford et al.,
2016). For example in Brazil, name is one of the main
variables available for linkage of administrative data
(along with sex, date of birth and municipality).
Although name can be a highly discriminative variable,
the number of diﬀerent ways it can be structured in
Brazilian datasets can be problematic: a woman with
ﬁve names might have them all recorded in one dataset,
but only her ﬁrst and last name in another dataset. The
level of data cleaning performed therefore requires
careful thought, as there is a need to retain the discrim-
inative power of individual identiﬁers whilst standardis-
ing variables across datasets. Heavy data cleaning can
reduce the variability between identiﬁers and reduce the
ability to distinguish one record from another (Randall
et al., 2013).
Many string comparators and phonetic coding sys-
tems have been developed in order to overcome diﬀer-
ences in the way names are recorded (Newcombe et al.,
1989a, 1989b). Soundex codes, which reduce strings to
four characters, are one of the most commonly used
phonetic algorithms for indexing names in the English
language, although other codes exist for diﬀerent lan-
guages (Mortimer and Salathiel, 1995; Russell, 1918,
1922; Zahoransky´ and Pola´sˇek, 2010). A number of
string comparators also exist, which provide a similar-
ity score for two strings, typically based on the number
of character changes needed to make the two identical
(e.g. the Jaro-Winkler comparator) (Grannis et al.,
2004; Winkler, 1995).
Blocking
As the size of available administrative datasets
increases, an important consideration is how to
reduce the number of comparisons made between rec-
ords. The analysis of large unlinked datasets can
require specialist software and high performance com-
puting, and linkage compounds the capacity issue: if
every record in one dataset is compared with every
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record in another dataset, the total number of pairwise
comparisons is the product of ﬁle sizes. Pairwise com-
parisons quickly become unmanageable in administra-
tive datasets like the 100 million cohort in Brazil, which
comprises detailed socio-economic data on over half of
the population (114 million people at baseline) and con-
tinues to expand as new individuals are added to the
register each year (Rasella et al., 2013). The problem is
exaggerated further with linkage of multiple data
sources.
Therefore, blocking strategies are often used, which
restrict comparison pairs to those likely to match.
Blocking strategies determine which records are (and
are not) considered as matches, which potentially
aﬀects the overall accuracy of the linkage process.
For example, blocking on a particular geographical
region or location would only consider pairs of records
as potential matches if they agreed on that location; any
errors in this variable would prevent records from link-
ing. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to
deciding on blocking strategies, by assessing quality
and completeness of each candidate blocking variable.
Linkage methods
In some countries, a unique personal number is
required for access to services and can be readily used
to obtain information about individuals. For example
national legislations in the Scandinavian countries have
created a single unique personal identity number for
each resident used in all administrative contexts;
health care, judiciary, tax, military and educational sys-
tems. Such identiﬁers practically make it possible to
link data from many diﬀerent administrative sources
with marginal error (Ludvigsson et al., 2009). Linkage
with these unique personal identiﬁers is so accurate that
data can be pooled from diﬀerent countries to create
very large study populations, thereby enabling longitu-
dinal studies of rare medical conditions with a cohort
approach (Olsen et al., 2010).
However in many other countries, unique identiﬁers
for linkage across sources are not available, because
unique identiﬁers that do exist are domain speciﬁc
and have been created by administrative organisations
for their own purposes, and may operate at diﬀerent
levels of jurisdiction (Ludvigsson et al., 2009; United
National Economic Commission for Europe, 2007).
For example in the UK, the National Insurance
number is used by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs
and the Department of Work and Pensions for employ-
ment and taxation data; the National Health Service
(NHS) number is used for health services in England,
and the Community Health Index (CHI) number is the
primary health identiﬁer in Scotland; none of these are
reliably used in education data. In Ontario and
Manitoba, encoded provincial health card numbers
that are used to link health data are not used in other
government departments such as social care, education
or immigration (Chiu et al., 2016). Similarly in Brazil
and Australia, diﬀerent numbers are used for diﬀerent
administrative purposes (e.g. identiﬁcation, employ-
ment, taxation, social protection, and health).
In the absence of a unique identiﬁer, linkage needs to
balance the risk of missed-matches (failing to link
records belonging to the same individual) with false-
matches (erroneously linking records belonging to dif-
ferent individuals) (Table 1). There are two broad
approaches to data linkage: deterministic and probabil-
istic. Both methods rely on ﬁnding agreement on a set
of common identiﬁers such as name, date / place of
birth, and address. In practice, linkage projects often
use a combination of deterministic and probabilistic
methods, with algorithms developed in an iterative pro-
cess of trial and error, involving manual review and
estimation of linkage error rates (Roos et al., 1986).
Deterministic linkage. Deterministic linkage uses a set of
pre-determined rules to classify records as belonging to
the same or diﬀerent individuals. For example in the
UK, hospital admission records for the same individual
over time are linked together using a three-step deter-
ministic algorithm based on combinations of NHS
number, date of birth, sex and postcode (Hagger-
Johnson et al., 2015). Deterministic methods are typic-
ally prone to missed-matches, as any recording errors or
missing values can prevent a set of identiﬁers from agree-
ing. Conversely, false-match rates are typically low, as
records belonging to diﬀerent individuals are unlikely to
agree on a complete set of identiﬁers by chance (Grannis
et al., 2002).
Probabilistic linkage. Probabilistic methods are arguably
more suited to linkage of error-prone administrative
data, which can also be subject to changes over time
(e.g. addresses) (Fellegi and Sunter, 1969; Newcombe
et al., 1959; Sayers et al., 2015). In probabilistic linkage,
a match weight is assigned to each pair of records, with
higher weights indicating a greater likelihood that the
pair is a true match. Where identiﬁers agree, a positive
Table 1. Linkage error.
Match status
Match (pair from
same individual)
Non-match (pair from
different individuals)
Link status
Link Identified match False-match
Non-link Missed-match Identified non-match
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contribution is made to the match weight; disagreement
contributes a penalty to the weight. In the simplest case,
each identiﬁer contributes separately to the match
weight, taking into account the discriminative value of
each identiﬁer, so that, for example, agreement on date of
birth would contribute more evidence of a match than
agreement on sex.
In the standard Fellegi–Sunter probabilistic proced-
ure, match weights are derived from two conditional
probabilities: the m-probability (the probability that an
identiﬁer agrees given records belong to the same individ-
ual) and the u-probability (the probability that an identi-
ﬁer agrees given records belong to diﬀerent individuals).
The u-probability represents the frequency of values for
each identiﬁer, i.e. the probability of chance agreement on
sex is ½; the probability of chance agreement on month
of birth is 1/12, and so on. M-probabilities represent the
error rate in a particular identiﬁer. For example, if sex
were miscoded in 5% of record pairs, the m-probability
would be 0.95. These probabilities are typically estimated
via a statistical model, and the overall match weight is
calculated as a function of these probabilities, usually the
ratio log2(m/u) for each identiﬁer, summed across all
identiﬁers (Brown et al., 2017). Adaptations to standard
match weight calculation include frequency-speciﬁc
match weights, which assign greater weights to less
common identiﬁer values and thus provide greater dis-
crimination between matches and non-matches (Zhu
et al., 2009).
Record pairs are classiﬁed as links or non-links
depending on whether the corresponding match
weight reaches a cut-oﬀ threshold. Often, two thresh-
olds are chosen: pairs with weights above the upper
threshold are classiﬁed as links; pairs with weights
below the lower threshold are classiﬁed as non-links;
those in the middle are inspected further (e.g. through
manual review). Choice of threshold values is import-
ant, as adjusting the thresholds changes the balance
between the number of false-matches and missed-
matches (Krewski et al., 2005). However, choosing
optimal thresholds is not straightforward, and is often
a subjective process based on manual review of record
pairs, guided by plotting the distribution of match
weights (Blakely and Salmond, 2002; Dusetzina et al.,
2014). If manual review is not feasible, e.g. due to a lack
of resources or too large a dataset, a single optimal
threshold may be chosen by calculating quality
measures at a number of diﬀerent threshold values
and comparing these to levels of acceptable error for
a particular study (Christen and Goiser, 2007).
Many linkage systems often use a combination
of deterministic and probabilistic approaches.
Deterministic methods are computationally inexpensive
relative to probabilistic methods and are easier to imple-
ment, but may not achieve suﬃcient linkage quality.
Privacy preserving linkage. There are some situations in
which identiﬁers cannot be released for linkage. For
example, the Oﬃce for National Statistics Beyond
2011 programme involved linkage of information
from diﬀerent government departments on all individ-
uals in England and Wales to support the UK Census,
and a decision was made to handle only non-identiﬁ-
able data to maintain a high level of data security. The
programme therefore explored privacy preserving
record linkage (known as PPRL) for linking encrypted
identiﬁers (Abbott et al., 2015). Encryption transforms
identiﬁers (such as date of birth or name) into hashed
values in order to avoid re-identiﬁcation of individuals.
The challenge in the adoption of privacy preserving
methods is achieving high levels of privacy protection
without negatively impacting on performance and link-
age quality (accuracy of results). One of the limitations
of encrypted identiﬁers is that, by design, similar iden-
tiﬁers look very diﬀerent once encryption has taken
place. For example, a hash function may transform
the name ‘‘John’’ to the string ‘8C17A3BB4CAF719
D165097900B390161’ and the name ‘Jon’ to
‘861A421C1A05E0E8FA24A1534159691F’. Only one
character diﬀers in the original identiﬁers, yet the
hashed values are completely diﬀerent. This compli-
cates the process of assessing the similarity between
identiﬁers on diﬀerent records.
Such problems can be overcome through the use of
‘match-keys’, which take elements from each identiﬁer
(e.g. ﬁrst letter of ﬁrst name, ﬁrst letter of second name,
day of birth and postcode preﬁx), or Bloom ﬁlters,
which decompose a string into bigrams (2-character
strings) and map these bigrams to a speciﬁc position
in a binary array. Bloom ﬁlters are more complex
data structures than standard hashing functions, and
although they preserve anonymity, can be compared
using a similarity index such as the Dice coeﬃcient
(Schnell et al., 2009). In Brazil, software using
encrypted data via Bloom ﬁlters has been developed
to link the 100 million cohort (using Spark) (Pita
et al., 2015). Australia have also progressed probabilis-
tic linkage using Bloom Filters to supplement existing
linkage systems. A recent project successfully veriﬁed
PPRL using Bloom ﬁlters in terms of privacy, scalabil-
ity, error tolerance and security, using real-world data
from New South Wales and Western Australia.
Alternative linkage methods. Although traditional meth-
ods rely on personal identiﬁers for linkage, other aux-
iliary variables can provide further evidence about
linkage probabilities. For example, a measure of
height in one ﬁle and a measure of weight in the
other could potentially provide information about the
likelihood of a true match. Indirect identiﬁers, such as
clinical information, have also been successfully
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incorporated within linkage algorithms and have the
potential to reduce disclosiveness within linkage
(Harron et al., 2016; Setoguchi et al., 2014). One
approach that utilises such auxiliary variables is ‘prior
informed imputation’, which treats linkage as a missing
data problem, incorporating information on these vari-
ables at the stage of model ﬁtting and performing an
imputation procedure using the probabilistic weights
assigned to ‘candidate’ records as Bayesian priors
(Goldstein et al., 2012). The advantage of this method
is that it exploits relationships between identiﬁers and
non-identifying variables (Goldstein and Harron, 2015;
Harron et al., 2014). A number of other Bayesian
models for linkage have been explored, but are not
yet widely used due to a number of required assump-
tions about distribution of errors, ﬁle structure and
model speciﬁcation (Tancredi and Liseo, 2011).
Implications for research
The nature of the data to be linked will determine
whether a large-scale linkage system is established
(requiring a dedicated IT infrastructure and support),
where linked datasets are produced in a ‘one size ﬁts all’
manner, or whether ad-hoc linkage can be achieved,
tailored to a speciﬁc research question (Jones et al.,
2014). In each of these scenarios, choices will need to
be made regarding data cleaning procedures, strategies
for blocking, and linkage methods. Ideally, these
choices are based on contextual knowledge about the
quality and quantity of identiﬁers in the underlying
datasets, which may come from both the data provider
and the researcher. However, choices may also be
restricted by the availability of identiﬁers, e.g. if gov-
ernance requires that only encrypted identiﬁers can be
released. PPRL remains a contentious issue, as any
errors in original identiﬁers are embedded within
encrypted identiﬁers, meaning that this approach is
less ﬂexible and more diﬃcult to evaluate than linkage
using unencrypted identiﬁers. Achieving a balance
between data protection and accuracy and usability of
the resulting linked dataset is an ongoing area of
research (Vatsalan et al., 2013).
Sharing of information about each step of the link-
age process between data providers, linkers and ana-
lysts, can help improve transparency and increase
understanding of the reliability of the linked data
(Gilbert et al., 2017). For example, Statistics Canada
have published a Record Linkage Project Process
Model, which describes common practices for linkage
within the Agency (Sanmartin et al., 2017). ICES in
Ontario produce a ‘Linkability Report’ for each of
their data holdings, which provides the number and
percentage of linked records (by type: deterministic or
probabilistic) and unlinked records by year.
Evaluating linkage quality
Linkage error
Linkage error arises when pairs of records are incor-
rectly classiﬁed (Table 1). False-matches occur when
records from diﬀerent individuals link erroneously.
Missed-matches, where records from the same individ-
ual fail to link, occur in data where identiﬁers are prone
to misreporting (e.g. typographical errors), changes
over time (e.g. married women’s surnames; addresses)
or missing values. Linkage errors in administrative data
are inevitable due to the imperfect and transient nature
of identiﬁers, and even small amounts of linkage error
can result in substantially biased results (Neter et al.,
1965).
Missed-matches can result in a loss of generalisabil-
ity, or selection bias, if particular subgroups of records
are more or less likely to link (non-random or diﬀeren-
tial linkage error) (Bohensky et al., 2010; Ford et al.,
2006; Lariscy, 2011). Depending on the data source,
studies have found that data quality varies according
to a number of characteristics including age, sex, eth-
nicity and health status (Bohensky, 2015). This can lead
to, for example, lower match rates in more vulnerable
or deprived populations.
False-matches are a further challenge. When records
from two diﬀerent individuals are linked together, asso-
ciations between variables can be diluted or spurious
associations created. When a record is linked but no
link should have been made (e.g. linking a survivor to
a mortality record), this can have implications for
prevalence estimates (such as overestimating a rate).
If false matches depend on individual characteristics
(e.g. sex, because of maiden/married name inconsisten-
cies) this may lead to biased estimates of association,
e.g. if sex is related to both the exposure and outcome
of interest.
Measuring linkage error
Many linkage studies report the proportion of records
that were linked, i.e. the match rate. Other frequently
reported measures of linkage quality include sensitivity
and speciﬁcity, and positive and negative predictive
values, which are directly related to rates of false- and
missed-matches (Christen and Goiser, 2005; Ferrante
and Boyd, 2012). However, these measures in them-
selves do not provide information on how results of
analyses might be aﬀected in terms of bias, and are
not always relevant. For example, match rate is only
helpful if you know how many records from a particu-
lar dataset should be linked.
Box 2 summarises several methods for evaluating
linkage quality, including comparisons with gold-
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standard data, post-linkage validation, comparisons of
linked and unlinked data, and sensitivity analyses
(Harron et al., 2017).
Implications for research
Linkage error can threaten the reliability of results
based on analyses of linked administrative data.
However, eﬀective communication between data pro-
viders, linkers and analysts allows sharing of informa-
tion that enables the quality of linkage to be evaluated
(Gilbert et al., 2017). Analysis strategies can then be
based on an understanding of the data linkage pro-
cesses, the context of the data itself and the research
question to be addressed.
The type of evaluation conducted will depend on the
context of the data environment (Harron et al., 2017).
For example, evaluation of linkage using a gold-
standard dataset is usually performed by those
conducting the linkage, since researchers themselves
rarely have access to identiﬁable data. In contrast,
post-linkage validation, sensitivity analyses and
comparison of characteristics of linked and unlinked
records can be performed by the researcher, given the
data linker provides certain non-sensitive information
about the linkage process. Information that should be
passed on to researchers to facilitate these evaluations
include meta-data on the quality of each link (such as
the decision-rule or match weight), and record-level or
aggregate characteristics of unlinked records (to iden-
tify potential sources of bias).
For example, the body performing most linkage of
hospital records for the NHS in England (NHS Digital)
provide data users with a match rank for each linked
record that indicates which identiﬁers were used for a
particular match. The Institute of Clinical Evaluative
Sciences in Ontario provide researchers with a linkage
report, which summarises the linkage strategy and out-
comes for each linkage step; linkage weights can be
added to each record in the linked data. This informa-
tion is helpful for researchers to understand exactly
how decisions about each record were made, to evalu-
ate the quality of each link, and to take into account
potential biases.
Study designs should be informed by information on
the quality of linkage, and can be optimised to account
for potential bias due to linkage error, or uncertainty in
linkage between data sources. For example, consider an
‘informative’ linkage, aiming to ascertain case-status by
linking to a registry dataset (such as death notiﬁcations
or infection surveillance). In this scenario, linkages with
high positive predictive value lend themselves to case–
control study designs, which require certainty that
linked records really do represent true cases, but do
Box 2. Evaluating linkage quality.
Approach Key points
‘Gold standard’ or reference data  Data where the true match status is known, used to test linkage algorithms and estimate rates
of linkage error.
 Typically based on a subsample of records that have been manually reviewed, an additional
data source with complete identifiers, a representative synthetic dataset, or external refer-
ence rates for the population of interest
 For example, comparison of mortality rates based on linkage of death registrations versus
national figures (Schmidlin et al., 2013) or comparison of infection rates within a subset of
validated data (Harron et al., 2013, Paixao et al., in press).
Post-linkage data validation  Used to estimate minimum false-match rates by identifying implausible scenarios within
the data.
 For example, linkage of a hospital admission record following a known date of death could
indicate a false-match; as could linkage of multiple death records to a single census record
(Blakely and Salmond, 2002; Hagger-Johnson et al., 2014).
Sensitivity analyses  Used to assess the extent to which results vary according to different linkage criteria.
 Could involve changing the linkage algorithm or changing the threshold within probabilistic
linkage, and re-running analyses to evaluate any impact on results (Lariscy, 2011).
 For example, comparing results over a range of match weights could help identify the
direction of the effect of linkage errors on outcomes of interest (Moore et al., 2014).
Comparing characteristics of
linked and unlinked data
 Used to identify any differences in linkage rates for different subgroups of individuals.
 For example, comparing rates of preterm birth in linked and unlinked maternity records
(Ford et al., 2006; Harron et al., 2016).
 Where not all records are expected to match, distributions of variables in the linked data can
be compared to external sources (e.g. age and/or ethnic group distributions from national
census data) to explore any evidence of selection bias (Harron et al., 2016).
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not necessarily require all possible matches to be iden-
tiﬁed (Paixao et al., in press). This strategy requires
discussion between researchers and data linkers, so
that criteria for deﬁning records as certain links and
certain non-links can be agreed upon. On the other
hand, linkages with high levels of linkage are more
relevant to cohort study designs that prioritise high
sensitivity to provide reliable prevalence estimates. In
the latter case, analyses can also incorporate inverse-
probability weights (e.g. from survey methodology), to
provide values for records that could not be accurately
linked. Further methods such as prior informed imput-
ation or multiple imputation can also be used where
there is uncertainty about the correct link, provided
certain non-sensitive characteristics that predict link-
ages are shared with researchers (Harron et al., 2014).
Remaining challenges and future
directions
While many of the technical challenges of safe data
linkage environments have been overcome, there are
situations where signiﬁcant legal and administrative
challenges remain (Harron et al., 2015). These, in
turn, impact on data availability and accessibility for
research and policy development. Although some juris-
dictions adopt approaches for timely and cost-eﬀective
access to linked data (e.g. those in Ontario, Wales and
Australia where linkage keys can be held in perpetuity),
others are restricted by the ‘link and destroy’ model,
where linked data cannot be reused. A lack of stream-
lined approval processes also contributes to ineﬃcient
processes for data access.
There are a number of areas of ongoing research in
facilitating access to data once it has been linked. For
example, data perturbation adds noise to data so that
the risk of re-identiﬁcation is reduced to within speci-
ﬁed limits, i.e. by ﬁxing the probability that a record
corresponds to the target individual. This technique
retains the statistical properties of data for analyses
and requires that analysts adjust for the added noise
using a measurement error model. Alternatively, syn-
thetic data allow researchers to test out analyses on a
dataset that mimics the structure of real data but that
does not correspond to real individuals. This allows
researchers to explore potential modelling strategies
prior to analysing the original data, thus reducing the
time spent within a safe setting (Dennett et al., 2015).
However, selecting appropriate models for a particular
analysis relies on the correct structure being identiﬁed
in the synthetic data, otherwise model estimates may be
biased.
The need to balance both privacy (for the individual)
and quality (for research purposes) of linked data is a
priority for research in data linkage methods. The
dynamic, error-prone and incomplete nature of admin-
istrative data makes a certain level of linkage error
inevitable, and this is compounded when data are
required to be anonymised before linkage. Developing
methods to adjust for biases arising for linkage error
is therefore vital for producing robust evidence to
inform policy.
Bridging the gap between linkage and analysis is a
major challenge for progress in the area of linkage qual-
ity. Researchers often struggle to obtain the informa-
tion they need to evaluate linkage and to developing
methods to account for any potential bias due to link-
age error (Jorm, 2015). Recently published guidelines
on the information that should be shared between data
linkers and researchers are an important step towards
increasing the reliability of research using linked
administrative data (Gilbert et al., 2017). Sharing of
this information can support transparent reporting of
studies using linked administrative data (Benchimol
et al., 2015). As methodologies continue to evolve to
address issues of data security and quality, there is an
ongoing need to evaluate the most eﬀective ways of
sharing this information.
Authors’ contribution
All authors contributed to the drafting of the manuscript.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Bianca De Stavola for com-
menting on an early draft of the paper.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following ﬁnancial sup-
port for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article: Wellcome Trust [grant number 103975/Z/14/Z].
References
Abbott O, Jones P and Ralphs M (2015) Large-scale linkage
for total populations in official statistics. In: Harron K,
Dibben C and Goldstein H (eds) Methodological
Developments in Data Linkage. Chapter 8. London: Wiley.
Aldridge RW, Shaji K, Hayward AC, et al. (2015) Accuracy
of probabilistic linkage using the enhanced matching
system for public health and epidemiological studies.
PLoS ONE 10: e0136179.
Benchimol EI, Smeeth L, Guttmann A, et al., and the Record
Working Committee (2015). The REporting of studies
Conducted using Observational Routinely-collected
health Data (RECORD) statement. PLoS Medicine 12:
e1001885.
Harron et al. 9
Blakely T and Salmond C (2002) Probabilistic record linkage
and a method to calculate the positive predictive value.
International Journal of Epidemiology 31: 1246–1252.
Bohensky M (2015) Bias in data linkage studies. In: Harron
K, Dibben C and Goldstein H (eds) Methodological
Developments in Data Linkage. Chapter 4. London: Wiley.
Bohensky M, Jolley D, Sundararajan V, et al. (2010) Data
linkage: A powerful research tool with potential problems.
BMC Health Services Research 10: 346–352.
Boyd J, Ferrante A, O’Keefe C, et al. (2012) Data linkage
infrastructure for cross-jurisdictional health-related
research in Australia. BMC Health Services Research 12:
480.
Brown AP, Randall SM, Ferrante AM, et al. (2017)
Estimating parameters for probabilistic linkage of priv-
acy-preserved datasets. BMC Medical Research
Methodology 17: 95.
Chiu M, Lebenbaum M, Lam K, et al. (2016) Describing the
linkages of the immigration, refugees and citizenship
Canada permanent resident data and vital statistics
death registry to Ontario’s administrative health database.
BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 16: 135.
Christen P and Goiser K (2005) Assessing deduplication and
data linkage quality: What to measure? In: Proceedings
of the fourth Australasian data mining conference
(ed AUSDM), Sydney, Australia, December 2005.
Christen P and Goiser K (2007) Quality and complexity mea-
sures for data linkage and deduplication. Quality Measures
in Data Mining. Springer, pp. 127–151.
Dattani N, Hardelid P, Davey J, et al., Research
OBOTWGOT, Paediatrics PDOTRCO and Health C
(2013). Accessing electronic administrative health data
for research takes time. Archives of Disease in Childhood
98: 391–392.
de Montjoye YA, Radaelli L, Singh VK, et al. (2015) Identity
and privacy. Unique in the shopping mall: On the reiden-
tifiability of credit card metadata. Science 347: 536–539.
Dennett A, Norman P, Shelton N, et al. (2015) A Synthetic
Longitudinal Study for the United Kingdom. Available at:
http://calls.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/NewSpineWrite
UpV2.0.pdf (accessed 23 October 2015).
Dibben C, Elliot M, Gowans H, et al. (2015) The data linkage
environment. In: Harron K, Dibben C and Goldstein H
(eds) Methodological Developments in Data Linkage.
Chapter 3. London: Wiley.
Dusetzina SB, Tyree S, Meyer A-M, et al. (2014) Linking
Data for Health Services Research: A Framework and
Instructional Guide. Rockville, MD: Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (US).
Farinelli F, Barcellos de Almeida M and Linhares de Souza Y
(2015) Linked Health Data: how linked data can help pro-
vide better health decisions. Stud Health Technol Inform
216: 1122.
Fellegi IP and Sunter AB (1969) A theory for record linkage.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 64:
1183–1210.
Ferrante A and Boyd J (2012) A transparent and transport-
able methodology for evaluating Data Linkage software.
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 45: 165–172.
Ford JB, Roberts CL and Taylor LK (2006) Characteristics
of unmatched maternal and baby records in linked birth
records and hospital discharge data. Paediatric and
Perinatal Epidemiology 20: 329–337.
Gilbert R, Lafferty R, Hagger-Johnson G, et al. (2017)
GUILD: Guidance for information about linking datasets.
Journal of Public Health. Epub ahead of print 28 March
2017. DOI: 10.1093/pubmed/fdx037.
Goldstein H and Harron K (2015) Record linkage: A missing
data problem. In: Harron K, Dibben C and Goldstein H
(eds) Methodological Developments in Data Linkage.
Chapter 6. London: Wiley.
Goldstein H, Harron K and Wade A (2012) The analysis of
record-linked data using multiple imputation with data
value priors. Statistics in Medicine 31: 3481–3493.
Grannis S, Overhage J and McDonald C (2002) Analysis of
identifier performance using a deterministic linkage algo-
rithm. In: Proceedings AMIA symposium, San Antonio,
TX, November 2002, pp. 305–309.
Grannis S, Overhage J and McDonald C (2004) Real world
performance of approximate string comparators for use in
patient matching. Studies in Health Technology and
Informatics 107: 43–47.
Hagger-Johnson G, Harron K, Fleming T, et al. (2015) Data
linkage errors in hospital administrative data when apply-
ing a pseudonymisation algorithm to paediatric intensive
care records. BMJ Open 5: e008118. doi: 10.1136/bmjo-
pen-2015-008118.
Hagger-Johnson G, Harron K, Gonzalez-Izquierdo A, et al.
(2014) Identifying false matches in anonymised hospital
administrative data without patient identifiers. Health
Services Research 50: 1162–1178.
Harron K, Dibben C and Goldstein H (2015)Methodological
Developments in Data Linkage. London: Wiley.
Harron K, Doidge J, Knight H, et al. (2017) A guide to
evaluating linkage quality for the analysis of linked data.
International Journal of Epidemiology 46(5): 1699–1710.
Harron K, Gilbert R, Cromwell DA, et al. (2016) Linking
data for mothers and babies in de-identified electronic
health data. PLoS One 11: e0164667.
Harron K, Goldstein H, Wade A, et al. (2013) Linkage, evalu-
ation and analysis of national electronic healthcare data:
Application to providing enhanced blood-stream infection
surveillance in paediatric intensive care. PLoS One 8:
e85278.
Harron K, Wade A, Gilbert R, et al. (2014) Evaluating bias
due to data linkage error in electronic healthcare records.
BMC Medical Research Methodology 14: 36.
Hashimoto RE, Brodt ED, Skelly AC, et al. (2014)
Administrative database studies: Goldmine or goose
chase? Evidence-Based Spine-Care Journal 5: 74–76.
Holman C, Bass J, Rosman D, et al. (2008) A decade of data
linkage in Western Australia: Strategic design, applica-
tions and benefits of the WA data linkage system.
Australian Health Review 32: 766–777.
Information Commissioner’s Office (2016) The Guide to Data
Protection.. Availabe at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisa-
tions/guide-to-data-protection/.
Information Commissioner’s Office (2012) Anonymisation:
Managing Data Protection Risk Code of Practice.
10 Big Data & Society
Available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisa-
tion-code.pdf.
Jones KH, Ford DV, Jones C, et al. (2014) A case study of the
Secure Anonymous Information Linkage (SAIL)
Gateway: A privacy-protecting remote access system for
health-related research and evaluation. Journal of
Biomedical Informatics 50: 196–204.
Jones KH, Laurie G, Stevens L, et al. (2017) The other side
of the coin: Harm due to the non-use of health-related
data. International Journal of Medical Informatics 97:
43–51.
Jorm L (2015) Routinely collected data as a strategic resource
for research: Priorities for methods and workforce. Public
Health Research and Practice 25: e2541540.
Jutte DP, Roos L and Brownell MD (2011) Administrative
record linkage as a tool for public health research. Annual
Review of Public Health 32: 91–108.
Kelman C, Bass A and Holman C (2002) Research use of
linked health data – A best practice protocol. Australian
and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 26: 251–255.
Krewski D, Dewanji A, Wang Y, et al. (2005) The effect of
record linkage errors on risk estimates in cohort mortality
studies. Survey Methodology 31: 13–21.
Lariscy JT (2011) Differential record linkage by hispanic eth-
nicity and age in linked mortality studies. Journal of Aging
Health 23: 1263–1284.
Longhurst JTN, Young C; Office for National Statistics
(2011) Statistical disclosure control for the UK Census.
Ludvigsson JF, Otterblad-Olausson P, Pettersson BU, et al.
(2009) The Swedish personal identity number: Possibilities
and pitfalls in healthcare and medical research. European
Journal of Epidemiology 24: 659–667.
Moore CL, Amin J, Gidding HF, et al. (2014) A new method
for assessing how sensitivity and specificity of linkage stu-
dies affects estimation. PLoS One 9: e103690.
Mortimer J and Salathiel J (1995) ‘Soundex’ codes of sur-
names provide confidentiality and accuracy in a national
HIV database. Communicable Disease Report. CDR
Review 5: R183–R186.
Neter J, Maynes E and Ramanathan R (1965) The effect of
mismatching on the measurement of response error.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 60:
1005–1027.
Newcombe H, Fair M and Lalonde P (1989a) Discriminating
powers of partial agreements of names for linking personal
records. Part I: The logical basis. Methods of Information
in Medicine 28: 86–91.
Newcombe H, Fair M and Lalonde P (1989b) Discriminating
powers of partial agreements of names for linking personal
records. Part II: The empirical test. Methods of
Information in Medicine 28: 92–96.
Newcombe H, Kennedy J, Axford S, et al. (1959) Automatic
linkage of vital records. Science 130: 954–959.
Ohm P (2010) Broken promises of privacy: Responding to the
surprising failure of anonymization. UCLA Law Review
57: 1701.
Olsen J, Bronnum-Hansen H, Gissler M, et al. (2010) High-
throughput epidemiology: Combining existing data from
the Nordic countries in health-related collaborative
research. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health 38:
777–779.
Paixao ES, Harron K, Andrade K, et al. (2017) Evaluation of
record linkage of two large administrative databases in a
middle income country: stillbirths and notifications of
dengue during pregnancy in Brazil. BMC Med Inform
Decis Mak 17(1): 108.
Pearson H (2015) Massive study to follow 80,000 British
babies cancelled. Nature 526: 620–621.
Pita R, Pinto C,Melo P, et al. (2015) A Spark-basedWorkflow
for Probabilistic Record Linkage of Healthcare Data.
EDBT/ICDT Workshops 2015, pp. 17–26.
Playford CJ, Gayle V, Connelly R, et al. (2016)
Administrative social science data: The challenge of repro-
ducible research. Big Data & Society 3: 2053951716684143.
Randall SM, Ferrante AM, Boyd JH, et al. (2013) The effect
of data cleaning on record linkage quality. BMC Medical
Research Methodology 13: 64.
Rasella D, Aquino R, Santos CAT, et al. (2013) Effect of a
conditional cash transfer programme on childhood mor-
tality: A nationwide analysis of Brazilian municipalities.
Lancet 382: 57–64.
Roos LL, Wajda A and Nicol JP (1986) The art and science of
record linkage: Methods that work with few identifiers.
Computers in Biology and Medicine 16: 45–57.
Russell R (1918) Soundex.
Russell R (1922) Soundex.
Sanmartin C, Trudeau R, Trainor C, et al. (2017) Statistics
Canada Record Linkage Project Process Model.
Sayers A, Ben-Shlomo Y, Blom AW, et al. (2015)
Probabilistic record linkage. International Journal of
Epidemiology 45: 954–964.
Schmidlin K, Clough-Gorr KM, Spoerri A, et al. (2013)
Impact of unlinked deaths and coding changes on mortal-
ity trends in the Swiss National Cohort. BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making 13: 1–11.
Schnell R, Bachteler T and Reiher J (2009) Privacy-preserving
record linkage using Bloom filters. BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making 9: 41.
Setoguchi S, Zhu Y, Jalbert JJ, et al. (2014) Validity of deter-
ministic record linkage using multiple indirect personal
identifiers: Linking a large registry to claims data.
Circulation: Cardiovascular Quality and Outcomes 7:
475–480.
Tancredi A and Liseo B (2011) A hierarchical Bayesian
approach to record linkage and population size problems.
Ann. Appl. Stat 5(2B): 1553–1585.
United National Economic Commission for Europe (2007)
Register-based statistics in the Nordic countries. Review
of best practices with focus on population and social stat-
istics. Available at: http://www.unece.org/
index.php?id=17470.
van Walraven C and Austin P (2012) Administrative database
research has unique characteristics that can risk biased
results. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 65: 126–131.
Vatsalan D, Christen P and Verykios VS (2013) A taxonomy
of privacy-preserving record linkage techniques.
Information Systems 38: 946–969.
Weitoft GR, Gullberg A, Hjern A, et al. (1999) Mortality
statistics in immigrant research: Method for adjusting
Harron et al. 11
underestimation of mortality. International Journal of
Epidemiology 28: 756–763.
Winkler W (1995) Matching and record linkage. In: Cox B
(ed.) Business Survey Methods. Chapter 11. New York,
NY: Wiley.
Zahoransky´ D and Pola´sˇek I (2010) Rule based phonetic
search approaches for central Europe. In: International
symposium on intelligent systems and informatics (SISY),
8th international symposium, Subotica, Serbia, 10–11
September 2010. IEEE, pp. 71–76.
Zhu V, Overhage M, Egg J, et al. (2009) An empiric modifi-
cation to the probabilistic record linkage algorithm using
frequency-based weight scaling. Journal of the American
Medical Informatics Association 16: 738–745.
12 Big Data & Society
